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FOLLOW THE EX PERTS
The only way to truly eliminate unnecessary 
bureaucracy, the author asserts, is to change 
the mission of service-level acquisition leaders 
to oversight, leaving decision-making to 
those with the right expertise to make those 
decisions. (Image courtesy of the U.S. Army 
Acquisition Support Center)
120 Army AL&T Magazine October-December 2016
A ttention, senior defense officials, senior service officers and con-gressional leaders: With all due respect, in most cases you are not the most qualified to make defense acquisition decisions. There are simply too many competing priorities and, frankly, you prob-
ably don’t know jack about most program specifics.
The root causes of the program failures within DOD are not hard to identify: 
changing requirements or “requirements creep”; military-unique, stringent 
ruggedization requirements; unstable budgets and limited resources; imma-
ture technology and integration challenges; the rapid pace of technology 
changes; deliberate decision support templates unsuitable for adapting to 
rapidly evolving threats; limited incentives and high barriers to entry for 
commercial innovation and competition because of a complex federal pro-
curement system built on myriad laws and regulations; and political pressures 
along with legitimate needs for a healthy defense industrial base to advance 
national policy objectives. The complex interaction of all these factors renders 
sweeping defense acquisition reform initiatives ineffective.
With all due respect, defense leaders, you don’t know 
jack: A former program manager offers his idea for 





















































































by Dr. Robert F. Mortlock, Col., USA (Ret.)
(The third in a quarterly series of commentaries by former program managers 
from the Naval Postgraduate School.)












The Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) and service leaders are the most 
capable leaders in the history of the pro-
fession of arms, as evidenced by the most 
respected, technologically advanced and 
most capable military force successfully 
executing missions around the world. 
OSD and service leaders are in many 
ways the equivalent of private-sector 
CEOs, overseeing programs in the bil-
lions of dollars. Like the rest of us, they 
have their capability gaps; the really suc-
cessful CEOs recognize these limitations 
and surround themselves with teams that 
compensate for these gaps. For example, 
would the CEO of a $2 billion com-
pany make a large financial commitment 
without the expert advice of at least one 
business adviser or a team of MBAs, as 
well as the board of directors? Not likely. 
Service leaders? Somehow, their opera-
tional leadership excellence equates to 




I don’t believe that recent legislation in 
the National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) for FY16 giving service chiefs 
more acquisition authority is a step in 
the right direction. The service chiefs will 
need to stand up acquisition cells to sup-
port these new responsibilities, adding 
more bureaucracy. 
The defense acquisition institution can 
be thought of as a three-legged stool, or 
a triad, with three decision support tem-
plates to guide programs: one for the 
generation of requirements, known as the 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Devel-
opment System (JCIDS); a second for the 
management of program milestones and 
knowledge points, known as the Defense 
Acquisition Management System and 
governed by the Defense Federal Acqui-
sition Regulation Supplement (DFARS); 
and a third for the allocation of resources 
known as the Planning, Program-
ming, Budgeting and Execution System 
(PPBES). (See Figure 1.) 
The service chiefs already have oversight 
over two of the three legs: requirements 
(JCIDS) and funding (PPBES). Real 
reform will only come when the service 
chiefs exercise control and oversight of 
requirements and funding, and layers of 
bureaucracy and oversight are eliminated 
from the third leg, the Defense Acquisi-
tion Management System described in 
the DOD 5000-series regulations.
Decades of acquisition “reform” ini-
tiatives have failed to produce true 
innovation and change within defense 
acquisition because they have not 
addressed requirements (capability-















      



























































BUR EAUCR ATIC OV ERKILL
The DOD 5000-series regulations spell out layers of bureaucracy and oversight for the Defense 
Acquisition Management System. (SOURCE: Dr. Robert F. Mortlock, Col., USA (Ret.))
FIGURE 1 
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(fiscal year- and calendar-driven) and acquisition (milestone- 
and event-driven) reform with equal vigor. Acquisition reform 
initiatives have tended to focus on the Defense Acquisition 
Management System—for example, annual NDAA acquisition 
reform initiatives from Congress and multiple Better Buying 
Power initiatives from DOD—and have not succeeded in inte-
grating these mutually supporting decision support templates.
One defense acquisition reform initiative that continually 
appears over the years is the elimination of non-value-added over-
sight and bureaucracy. The FY16 NDAA targets the reduction 
of layers of acquisition bureaucracy. In terms of lean thinking (a 
well-documented, successful commercial industry best practice), 
non-value-added oversight and bureaucracy equate to waste. All 
three iterations of the Better Buying Power (BBP) initiatives 
outline goals to streamline management, eliminate unnecessary 
oversight, reduce documentation and empower program man-
agers (PMs).
However, the success of specific actions taken to effectively 
change statute, policy or regulations and successfully imple-
ment these changes over time is debatable. Therefore, from a 
former PM’s perspective, I’ll make a specific recommendation 
that I believe would target the elimination of non-value-added 
oversight and bureaucracy. 
MY BIG IDEA
The only way we are ever going to truly eliminate unnecessary 
bureaucracy is to change the mission of OSD and service-level 
acquisition leaders to oversight, with decision-making being 
left to those with the expertise to make those decisions. Specifi-
cally, I believe that the milestone decision authority (MDA) for 
acquisition programs should be at the program executive offi-
cer (PEO) level. PEOs are trained, educated, certified members 
of the acquisition profession. They have decades of operational 
management experience and training in leading program offices, 
and they possess the necessary technical and business acumen, 
as well as the mandated acquisition certifications required of 
members of the acquisition profession. 
By making PEOs the MDA of acquisition programs, OSD and 
service acquisition staffs can be optimized for oversight roles 
exclusively. Their advice to senior leaders would be oversight 
and not decision-making—a lower threshold. Currently, OSD 
and service acquisition staffs have grown because they support 










DOD already has invested in the training, education and experience 
of PEOs. It could maximize this investment by empowering PEOs as the 
program milestone decision-makers. (SOURCE: U.S. Army Acquisition 
Support Center)
Would the CEO of a $2 billion 
company make a large financial 
commitment without the expert 
advice of at least one business 
adviser or a team of MBAs, as well 
as the board of directors? Not likely.











acquisition executives (CAEs) as deci-
sion-makers—considerably smaller staffs 
would be required to support the DAE 
or CAEs as oversight to PEO MDAs. 
Ultimately, MDA decisions are merely 
recommendations to service leadership, 
who control the overall service modern-
ization strategy with requirements and 
resources.
CONCLUSION
So, Congress—specifically, the House 
and Senate armed services committees, 
responsible for the NDAA—I’m talking 
to you: You got it right to try to legis-
late defense acquisition reform, but you 
didn’t target the root cause of the issue: 
non-value-added bureaucracy and over-
sight of programs. If you want to reduce 
service and OSD acquisition staffs and 
not simply transfer the bloat to another 
part of the service, strip the decision-
making authority away from top-level 
OSD and service officials and give that 
authority to the folks who are truly and 
uniquely qualified: members of the acqui-
sition profession who have the education, 
training, expertise and experience to 
make those decisions—PEOs. PEOs are 
demonstrated leaders, acquisition profes-
sionals, and an underutilized, invaluable 
national resource available for OSD and 
service leaders. 
The DOD 5000 directive is based clearly 
and rightly on the policy objectives of 
flexibility, responsiveness, innovation, 
discipline and streamlined, effective 
management while emphasizing compe-
tition. More BBP initiatives that reiterate 
the same concepts in the DOD 5000 
series are not needed. Enforce the prin-
ciples and concepts already outlined 
therein. Keep acquisition reform simple 
and target the non-valued-added pro-
cesses. Target bureaucracy, and the result 
will be the elimination of waste and the 
effective application of the commercial 
best practice of lean thinking. 
DOD already has invested in the train-
ing, education and experience of PEOs. 
Now it can maximize this investment by 
empowering PEOs as the program mile-
stone decision-makers. Make the PEOs 
the MDAs for their assigned programs 
by mandating it in new congressional 
NDAA legislation and by changing 
DOD acquisition policy and regulations. 
Can I say for sure that PEOs as MDAs 
would eliminate all acquisition program 
cost and schedule overruns and perfor-
mance shortfalls? Unfortunately, no. But 
it would empower the right folks and 
simplify the PM chain of command, 
applying a key principle of war—simplic-
ity—to defense acquisition. 
I acknowledge that this recommenda-
tion only addresses bureaucracy and 
oversight within the Defense Acquisition 
Management System—another incre-
mental reform approach, you might say. 
However, if we first establish trust and 
confidence in PEOs as MDAs, over time 
maybe we can expand the conversation 
to consider giving PEOs not only MDA 
responsibilities but funding and require-
ment authorities as well, thus applying 
another key principle of war: unity of 
command.
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Decades of acquisition “reform” initiatives 
have failed to produce true innovation and 
change within defense acquisition because 
they have not addressed requirements 
(capability-based and threat-driven), 
funding (fiscal year- and calendar-driven) 
and acquisition (milestone- and event- 
driven) reform with equal vigor.
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